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Abstract 
The present research examined gratitude in the U.K., contrasted features of gratitude with 
those identified in the U.S.A., and explored whether gratitude is associated with virtue. In 
three studies we demonstrated that gratitude is prototypically organized; that there are cross-
cultural differences between U.K. and U.S. descriptions of gratitude; and that judgments of 
gratitude are closely related to judgments of virtue. Study 1 demonstrated that the frequencies 
of negative attributes are considerably greater in the U.K. than in the U.S.A. We suggest that 
gratitude has a common core with culturally ubiquitous features, but also socially constructed 
elements specific to individual cultures. Study 2 noted discrepancies between centrality and 
frequency ratings. We propose that prototype analyses should consider both intuitive 
frequency ratings and the deliberative processes involved in assessing centrality. In Study 3, 
we noted a significant correlation between judgments of gratitude and judgments of virtue, 
suggesting the two are intrinsically linked. 
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Introduction 
Whilst gratitude research is prominent in the U.S.A, there has been comparably little focus on 
this topic in U.K culture (with the obvious exception of Alex Wood and colleagues; see, for 
example, Wood, Brown & Maltby, 2011; Wood, Froh & Geraghty, 2010). This paper offers 
an introductory examination of the concept of gratitude in the U.K., using prototype analysis.   
Why study gratitude? Gratitude has recently become something of a hot topic, 
especially in positive psychology. This is, no doubt, partially due to its positive psychological 
benefits. For instance, gratitude has been linked with subjective well-being (Emmons & 
McCullough, 2003; Froh, Sefick, & Emmons, 2008; Watkins, 2004); life satisfaction (Fagley, 
2012; Froh, Yurkewicz, & Kashdan, 2009); better mental health (Froh, Emmons, Card, Bono, 
& Wilson, 2011) and improvements in interpersonal relationships (Algoe, Haidt, & Gable, 
2008). Moreover, benefits are not restricted to improving one’s own personal circumstances; 
gratitude may also have socio-moral value and extend to external parties. For instance, 
McCullough and colleagues (2001) propose that gratitude has three moral functions that give 
rise to moral behaviors. They suggest, for example, that acts of gratitude can generate a spiral 
effect with one good act creating another, thereby producing a virtuous circle of events.  
What is gratitude? We believe that this question warrants a fresh look. From 
canvassing the topic at large, we have noted two key problems that affect the way gratitude is 
defined. The first major problem is an over-reliance, in the social-science literature, on 
dictionary definitions of gratitude, and a tendency to refer back to previous researchers’ 
characterizations of gratitude without stopping to consider how these might be developed or 
improved (see SecondAuthor, FirstAuthor, and ThirdAuthor, 2013). This reliance on existing 
definitions is problematic; what if the authors who are consistently quoted have overlooked 
an important aspect of what gratitude involves? With the exception of the paper by Lambert 
and colleagues (2009), there is a noticeable dearth of studies examining what gratitude is and 
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what features it involves. In this paper, we follow the example set by Lambert and colleagues 
(2009) and examine gratitude from the bottom up; namely, the features and characteristics 
that laypeople believe exemplify the concept.  
 The second problem surrounding the conceptualization of gratitude is that 
philosophers often superimpose their own assumptions of what gratitude is, what it entails, 
and when it is owed or warranted, sometimes disregarding the layperson’s experience and 
understanding of the concept. For instance, Roberts (2004) suggests that gratitude must 
involve a supererogatory act; that is, gratitude must go beyond what is due to you. He 
proposes that feeling gratitude towards those who are merely doing their job (a doctor, a 
lifeguard, a fire-fighter, etc.) is misplaced. However, if the layperson does feel gratitude 
towards a doctor or lifeguard, why must this be deemed “misplaced”?1 Whilst we recognize 
and appreciate the value of the conceptual work philosophers have undertaken on the subject 
of gratitude, we are keen to unite conceptual theorizing with the layperson’s experience. We 
consider it important to address the two major problems we have outlined; whilst we draw 
upon the work of psychologists and philosophers in the field, we want to avoid reliance on 
definitions already present in the psychology literature as well as overly tight philosophical 
conceptions of gratitude that may not fit with the layperson’s experience. To achieve this, we 
must start by focusing on what features and characteristics are common to experienced 
instances of gratitude and how the term “gratitude” is typically understood.  
How is gratitude conceptualized? Our recent conceptual analysis of gratitude, 
bringing together views from psychology and philosophy, has highlighted some important 
controversies (see SecondAuthor et al., 2013). For example, does a benefit have to 
materialize, or is the intention to benefit sufficient? Must gratitude involve a benefactor, or 
can you be grateful without attributing this to any person? And, most central to present 
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purposes, is gratitude inherently positively valenced, or does it involve some negative 
aspects?  
In the gratitude literature, and in psychology in particular, gratitude is typically 
portrayed as inherently positive (phenomenologically as well as morally). In fact, it has been 
deemed the “quintessential positive psychology trait” (Wood Joseph, Lloyd, & Atkins, 2009). 
However, gratitude is also closely associated with negative emotions such as indebtedness or 
feelings of obligation (to repay benefits). In fact, several studies have found a correlation 
between gratitude and indebtedness (e.g., Tesser, Gatewood, & Driver, 1968; Watkins, Sheer, 
Ovnicek, & Kolts, 2006). Despite these associations, researchers have tried to preserve 
gratitude’s status as exclusively “positive” by dissociating it from any negative emotions (see 
Watkins et al., 2006). The issue of whether gratitude is perceived as inherently positive is 
beginning to be questioned, however, with some researchers highlighting the need to examine 
whether gratitude has a darker side (Wood, Froh, & Geraghty, 2010). We are keen to 
examine this matter more closely by looking to the layperson’s experience; do people always 
view gratitude as positive, or are negative emotions sometimes implicated too? (see Study 1). 
Importantly, the studies presented in this paper allow for an interesting cross-cultural 
comparison between the U.K. and the U.S.A. by contrasting our findings here with those of 
Lambert and colleagues (2009). These two bodies of work are based on the same principles 
of prototype analysis (though conducted in quite distinct ways, see Studies 2 and 3). In these 
studies, laypeople generate features that exemplify gratitude, rate their valence and centrality, 
and the researchers examine how the centrality of these features affects laypeople’s cognition 
about gratitude (see the section, The Nature of Concepts: A Prototypical Approach). This 
comparison did uncover some exciting cross-cultural differences which suggest that at least 
some aspects of gratitude are context- (or culture-) dependent (see Study 1).   
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Finally, this paper begins to address whether gratitude is a virtue. Cicero is famously 
quoted for saying that “gratitude is not only the greatest of the virtues, but the parent of all 
others” (Cicero, Pro Plancio, 54 B.C.). But does the British public consider gratitude a 
virtue? In our final study we examine judgments of virtue alongside judgments of gratitude, 
and demonstrate that the two are significantly correlated (see Study 3). 
 
The Nature of Concepts: A Prototypical Approach 
Psychologist Eleanor Rosch (1975) describes a method of conceptual inquiry called a 
“prototypical approach.” According to Rosch, to demonstrate that a concept has a 
prototypical structure, two conditions must be met: first, it must be shown that certain 
features of a concept are more salient/central/representative than others. This is achieved by 
identifying features in a free-response format, which are subsequently rated for 
centrality/importance. In order to corroborate a prototypical structure, in Rosch’s sense, it 
must be demonstrated that centrality of features influences cognition with respect to the 
concept. A number of methods have been used to illustrate this internal structure, such as 
reaction time (Fehr & Russell, 1991; Gregg et al., 2008), recall memory (Fehr, 1988; Kearns 
& Fincham, 2004), recognition memory (Fehr, 1988; Kearns & Fincham, 2004; Lambert et 
al., 2009) and lexical decision tasks (Fehr & Russell, 1991). The greater the convergence of 
measures of internal structure, the greater the confidence with which one can argue that a 
concept is prototypically organized. 
Prototype analyses of this kind have many uses. They can shed light on similarities 
and differences between related concepts, such as Fehr’s (1988) analysis of the partially 
overlapping concepts of love and commitment. Secondly, features generated by prototype 
analyses can help with the task of defining and measuring concepts in ways which reflect lay 
usage rather than “expert” definitions.  
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Prototype analyses may also be used to highlight differences in the way in which a 
concept is understood cross-culturally or in different populations (see, e.g., Fehr, 1988). As 
highlighted in the Introduction, a key concern of the current paper is contrasting laypeople’s 
conceptions of gratitude across the U.K. and the U.S.A. When examining character strengths 
across fifty four nations, gratitude was found to be a character strength that people frequently 
endorsed (Park, Peterson, & Seligman, 2006). However, just because gratitude is a prevalent 
strength across many countries and cultures does not mean that it is conceptualized in the 
same way across these different cultures.  
  
Overview 
Our primary goal is to begin examining how laypeople in the U.K. construe gratitude. 
In Study 1, we examined the features and characteristics laypersons believe exemplify the 
concept of gratitude. These features are contrasted with those previously found in the U.S.A 
by Lambert and colleagues (2009). In Study 2, we asked a second group of participants to 
rate how central each feature highlighted in Study 1 is to the concept of gratitude. We 
demonstrate how frequency and centrality of features can diverge, and consequently suggest 
a new way of conducting prototype analyses. In Study 3, we fulfilled the final condition 
required for a prototype analysis by demonstrating how the centrality and frequency of a 
feature affects the layperson’s cognition about gratitude. In doing so, we also demonstrate 
how judgments of gratitude correlate strongly with judgments about virtue.  
 
Study 1 
 The first step of a prototype analysis is to compile a list of features or characteristics 
that are thought to exemplify the concept in question (Fehr, 1988; Fehr & Russell, 1984). 
Therefore, in Study 1 we asked respondents to list the features and characteristics they 
8 
 
believed to be common to instances of gratitude. We also asked participants to rate each 
feature they generated in terms of its positivity or negativity. 
 
Method 
 Participants  
 108 students from the University of Birmingham participated (98 female, aged 18–
40), in return for course credit. All participants were U.K. citizens.  
 Procedure 
 Participants were instructed to write down the features and characteristics they think 
typify the concept of gratitude. They were asked to think about how gratitude comes about 
and what happens afterwards, including the actions, emotions, thoughts, and feelings 
involved. Instructions were adapted from Fehr and Russell’s (1984) paper. Participants were 
instructed to rate the valence of their self-generated features using a 5-point Likert scale (1 = 
very negative to 5 = very positive). Note that the scale used here differs from the 6-point scale 
of Lambert et al. (2009) to allow for a neutral response.  
 
Results 
 A complete list of all features collected from the 108 participants was identified. This 
resulted in 896 features of gratitude, with participants generating a mean of 7.68 features 
each. These features were coded into larger categories following well-established procedures 
documented by Fehr (1988), and originally adapted from Rosenberg and colleagues 
(Rosenberg & Jones, 1972; Rosenberg & Sedlak, 1972). This logical procedure involves 
categorizing words based on linguistic and semantic similarity. The coding procedure was 
conducted separately by two independent raters. 
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The first step involved identifying distinctive features of gratitude. Items sharing the 
same word roots were categorized together, for example, “grateful” and “gratefulness” would 
be placed in the same category (ignoring any prefixes, suffixes or modifiers). Participants’ 
responses containing more than one feature were counted as multiple features. 
The second step scrutinized features at the level of semantic meaning. Features that 
had a similar meaning were grouped together; for instance, the categories of “happy” and 
“joyful” were combined. The two raters worked independently and tried to strike a balance 
between being conservative (allowing different categories to emerge) and avoiding 
redundancy (by collapsing similar groups).  
Before assessing the level of agreement across the two independent raters, the 
categories for analysis were determined. Any disagreements were resolved by a third 
researcher.  
This procedure resulted in 201 gratitude features. Of these features 138 were named 
by only one or two respondents and were discarded from the study, leaving 63 key features 
(see Table 1).  
The agreement between the two independent raters was assessed using Cohen’s 
Kappa. The level of agreement was very good at K = .87.  
The majority of key features were rated as positive (M = 4.29, SD = 0.70), with 
several features rated at the top of the scale and deemed very positive, including “happy”, 
“kindness,” “caring,” and “kissing”. However, a number of negatively rated features arose in 
the data, for instance, “obligation,” “indebtedness,” “guilt,” “ingratitude,” “embarrassed,” and 
“awkward.” Interestingly, some of these negative features were named with quite high 
frequency (see Table 1).  
 
[Table 1.] 
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A bivariate correlation of frequency scores across the two samples revealed a significant 
relationship between features generated in the U.K. and features generated in the U.S. sample 
by Lambert et al. (2009) (r = .73, p < .001). 
 
[Table 2.] 
 
Discussion 
 There appears to be significant overlap between the features generated in the U.K. and 
those previously generated in the U.S.A. Indeed, Table 1 (columns 1 – 5) demonstrates that 
38 of the 63 (or 60.34%) gratitude features found in our U.K. sample were also mentioned in 
the U.S. sample. This could suggest that a number of core gratitude features are recognized 
cross-culturally as significant markers of gratitude, for instance, being thankful, appreciative 
and feeling happy (see Table 2).  
 Another indication of the similarity in the way these two cultures appear to conceive 
gratitude can be seen in the high degree of correlation between the features generated in the 
two samples (r = .73, p < .001), with 53% of variance in the dataset being attributable to this 
correlation. This may add some support to Park, Peterson, and Seligman’s (2006) claim that 
gratitude is one of the “core virtues recognized across world cultures and throughout history” 
(p.119). 
 Perhaps more intriguing, however, are the differences found across these two samples, 
the most striking being the additional negative features highlighted by a significant number of 
U.K. participants. These additional negative features include guilt (“guilty,” “feeling guilty,” 
“sense of guilt if the favor is too great”); ingratitude (“thankless,” “being ungrateful for a 
gift,” “dismissing people’s efforts”); and embarrassed and awkward (“feeling a bit 
embarrassed,” “feeling blushed”). Interestingly, these features are not present in the U.S. 
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sample. Could it be that gratitude is conceptualized differently across the two different 
countries, with U.K. citizens having a more negative perception of gratitude? One might not 
be surprised by this claim when considering stereotypical depictions of a cynical Brit 
compared with an American optimist. Evidence that might support this idea comes from 
Fischer and Chalmers (2008). They conducted a meta-analysis of dispositional optimism 
across 22 nations to examine whether optimism is universal. The results demonstrated 
different levels of optimism cross-culturally with greater individualism correlating with 
higher levels of optimism (as measured by the Life Orientation Test). Importantly, the 
U.S.A.’s optimism score exceeds that of the U.K. (64.02 and 58.96 respectively). The authors 
also highlight that a proportion of the U.S. sample displayed extremely high (outlying) 
scores. Similarly, other research has suggested that individuals have an optimism bias 
(Sharot, 2011) and that, more specifically, samples of U.S. participants have been shown to 
be “unrealistically optimistic” (Rose, Endo, & Windschitl, 2008, p. 1236).   
An alternative explanation of the difference between our two samples could lie in the 
way in which the value of gratitude is acknowledged; are Americans more predisposed to 
celebrate gratitude? They do, after all, have a holiday dedicated to giving thanks. A more in-
depth examination of how gratitude is conceptualized would be needed to draw any strong 
conclusions here (see General Discussion). 
 Another possibility, of course, is that respondents in the U.K. sample were simply 
more open to admitting negative aspects of gratitude experience. Whilst we are not 
suggesting that British citizens are more honest than American citizens, it could be that the 
U.K. participants do not feel as great a need to accord gratitude a positive (pleasant) status. 
Indeed, we suggested in the Introduction that gratitude may not be the inherently positive 
emotion it is assumed to be. Our data suggests that gratitude may encompass or be associated 
with various negative emotions: indebtedness; obligation; guilt; ingratitude; embarrassment; 
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and awkwardness. Evidently the perception of gratitude as inherently positive should not be 
accepted outright. 
Another interesting difference between the samples appears to surround conventions 
of gratitude. Just under 10% of the U.K. sample identified “politeness” as a key gratitude 
feature, with responses including “good manners” and “custom.” Other responses provided 
by U.K. participants included “hand shake,” a well-known tradition of good manners and 
courtesy. Interestingly, these features did not appear in Lambert et al.’s list. Might this 
suggest another difference in the way gratitude is perceived? Is it possible that in the U.K. 
some people associate gratitude with a habitual process of thanking others; for example 
saying “thank you” to the bus driver as you step off the bus?  Once again, this issue would 
require a more extensive and in-depth measurement of how gratitude is conceptualized. 
The discrepancies between the samples suggest that although conceptualizations 
across cultures may overlap, they are not identical. One could view the concept of gratitude 
as having a common core that is shared across cultures, as well as some socially constructed 
elements that are specific to individual cultures (see Wood et al., 2010, p. 13). Examining 
these socially constructed elements may be an interesting area of research in itself, and is 
likely to have important implications for considering gratitude interventions as well as for 
exploring when, why, and for what or whom people are grateful in different cultures (see 
General Discussion).  
 
Study 2 
 The second stage of a prototype study involves categorizing the features of gratitude 
as either central or peripheral to the concept. Respondents should largely agree on which 
features are central or peripheral. We presented participants with the 63 key gratitude features 
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outlined in Study 1, and examined the degree to which centrality ratings of features 
converged across participants. 
 
Method 
Participants 
 97 students from the University of Birmingham (84 female, ages 18–36, mean age 19 
years, 3 months) took part in exchange for course credits. All participants were U.K. citizens. 
Students who participated in Study 1 were excluded from taking part. 
Design and Procedure  
 Following Lambert et al. (2009), participants were presented with the 63 key gratitude 
features identified by participants in Study 1 and were asked to rate how central (or 
important) each feature is to the concept of gratitude. Centrality was rated on an 8-point 
scale, from 1 = not at all central to 8 = extremely central. The order of features was 
randomized across participants to avoid order effects. 
 
Results 
 The mean centrality ratings can be seen in Table 1. Reliability tests revealed 
exceptionally high internal consistency when treating participants as items and features as 
cases (Cronbach α = .92).  
 A comparison of centrality scores with frequency scores (i.e., percentage of 
respondents that listed a given feature) from Study 1 revealed a significant positive 
correlation (r = .43, p < .001). This demonstrates that the features deemed most central in 
Study 2 were often named more frequently in Study 1.  
 A comparison of centrality scores with positivity ratings also revealed a significant 
correlation (r = .59, p < .001). This would suggest that when rated by centrality, top features 
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tend to be more positive. Interestingly, however, the correlation between centrality and 
positivity is not as high as that documented by Lambert et al. (2009), who found an 
exceptionally high correlation between these two factors (r = .84, p < .001). This difference 
would support the claim that in the U.K., gratitude, whilst viewed as a generally positive 
concept, is not considered as inherently positive as in the U.S.A. 
 
Discussion 
While there is a significant positive correlation between frequency scores (Study 1) and 
centrality scores (Study 2), there is a noticeable difference in rank order by centrality and rank 
order by frequency in some noteworthy cases (see Table 1). For instance, while “happy” was 
ranked at number 1 in terms of frequency, it was only accorded a rank of 15 by centrality. 
Similarly, “smile” was ranked 4 by frequency but only 13 by centrality. The disparity between 
ranks by frequency and centrality is particularly apparent in the case of the negatively valenced 
features. For example, “obligation/indebtedness” was ranked 6 in terms of frequency but 48 
with regard to centrality, and “guilt” emerged at 12 in the frequency rankings and 58 in terms 
of centrality. The differences between these two sets of ranks merits some discussion. 
It is suggested here that while frequency scores may reflect a largely uncritical and 
spontaneous listing of features, centrality ratings may be subject to more critical and measured 
judgment calls. It seems likely that when reflecting on the centrality of a given feature, 
participants will ask themselves whether a given characteristic should be a feature of the 
concept under consideration; we believe this could be at odds with what is a feature of the 
concept under consideration in the mental map of the participant.  
We suggest that when critically deliberating, people in Study 2 possibly “screened” 
features of gratitude, minimizing negative characteristics. That is, it is possible that participants 
judged whether it was “appropriate” to accord a high level of centrality to these negative 
features. Resultantly, it could be argued that these more deliberate processes of rating centrality 
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resulted in fewer endorsements of negative features of gratitude, with participants believing 
feelings of guilt or indebtedness should not be (as compared to are not) constitutive of  gratitude 
and rating them as less central features as a result.  
Rankings of feature centrality arguably involve more conscious, thoughtful reasoning 
whereas frequency ratings could tap more “implicit” and immediate concept features.  Indeed, 
experiential or intuitive processes are often set in opposition to rational or analytic processes 
(Epstein 2010; Haidt, 2001; Richetin, Perugini, Adjali, & Hurling, 2007). More recently, 
researchers have even begun to argue for the unique value of intuitive processes, particularly 
in the area of decision making. For instance, Epstein (2010) offers several advantages of 
intuitive processing, for example its fast and efficient nature, and Hogarth (2010) goes so far 
as to suggest that, in some cases, intuition can lead to better decisions than deliberative 
processing.  
It is important that “intuition” is not confused with “instinct” (Hogarth, 2010), as the 
latter might suggest that an intuitive process is innate, whilst it is commonly acknowledged 
that intuition can be learned. Therefore, whilst intuition may be faster and less cognitively 
demanding, this does not equate to the outcomes of intuition being purely instinctive and 
irrational (Sauer, 2012). In fact, Sauer (2012) offers a strong case why we might trust our moral 
intuitions as reflecting rational principles and suggests that intuition can be both useful and 
justified. He suggests that intuitions can have “normative force” and may be helpful guides in 
efficiently processing the real world. Whilst a prototype analysis is obviously different from 
moral judgment, we are in fact asking participants to identify features of what may be 
perceived, at least by some, as a morally salient concept, and Sauer’s argument would suggest 
that intuitive responses to situations conceptualized in terms of such concepts should not be 
dismissed out of hand. 
16 
 
Intuitive and rational processes may interact (Epstein, 2010), and it has been suggested 
that some individuals may rely on intuitive processing more whilst others favor deliberative 
processing (Richetin et al., 2007). In our case, if (some) individuals tend to react intuitively to 
instances of gratitude, perhaps the intuitive responses they describe in this prototype analysis 
may better mirror their actual gratitude experiences than their deliberative centrality ratings. 
Our final point in favor of considering intuitive as well as deliberative responses in a 
prototype analysis concerns the distinction between implicit and explicit processes in 
measuring attitudes. In recent years, such measurements have begun to encompass “implicit 
measures” which attempt to tap into implicit and (sometimes) unconscious attitudes. An 
example of this is the Implicit Association Task (IAT) which examines strengths of association 
between different constructs in order to gauge individuals’ underlying attitudes. Many 
researchers have suggested that implicit tasks are better able to truthfully explore people’s 
attitudes and, what is more, implicit measures have been shown to correlate strongly with actual 
behavior – unlike comparative explicit measures (Perugini & Leone, 2009). This speaks to our 
study; if participants are subsequently deliberating over their responses and screening those 
deemed “appropriate,” it may be likely that we are losing out on the more immediate (and, 
arguably, more honest) implicit features of gratitude that individuals perhaps do not want to 
consciously acknowledge. 
Taking these points on board, it is our belief that both thoughtful/deliberative and 
implicit/intuitive responses should be considered when building up a picture of a concept. Most 
prototype studies, however, have privileged centrality over frequency and have used centrality 
ranking to categorize features of concepts into central, peripheral, marginal, or remote kinds. 
Whilst we recognize the importance of deliberate ratings of centrality, we believe more 
credence should be given to the immediate and intuitive responses surrounding gratitude. That 
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is, we agree with Epstein’s conclusion that “neither system [intuitive or rational] is generally 
superior to the other as each has unique strengths” (2010, p. 310). 
The current paper, therefore, takes the novel step of combining frequency ranks with 
centrality ranks in the hope of striking a balance between the immediacy of responses given in 
Study 1 and the more considered judgments of Study 2. In order to give equal weight to 
frequency and centrality rankings, the sum of ranks from Study 1 and Study 2 (see Table 1, 
column 8) was used as a means of determining central, peripheral, marginal, and remote feature 
categories in Study 3.  
 
Study 3 
 Study 3 aims to fulfill the final criterion of a prototype study; demonstrating that 
feature centrality affects cognition about the concept. Here, we deviate somewhat from the 
methods outlined in Lambert et al. (2009) to follow a method introduced in a prototype study 
of modesty (Gregg, Hart, Sedikides, & Kumashiro, 2008). This study asked participants to 
make judgments about fictional characters that exhibited either central, peripheral, marginal, 
or remote features of modesty. In our study, Person A exhibits central features of gratitude 
and is described as “feels appreciative,” “expresses thanks,” and “feels respected.” Person B, 
on the other hand, exhibits marginal features of gratitude and “feels motivated,” “is 
optimistic,” and “feels blessed.” After reading the description, participants were presented 
with a series of questions, the key question for our purposes being “How GRATEFUL is this 
person?”  
 In order to establish that centrality of features affects cognition, we must demonstrate 
that fictional characters displaying more central features are rated as more grateful than those 
exhibiting less central features. An example from each of the conditions is shown in Figure 1.  
 The design of this study also allowed us to begin examining the link between 
gratitude and virtue. There is some debate as to whether gratitude constitutes a moral virtue 
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(ThirdAuthor, 2014). The argument is most prevalent in philosophy with academics debating 
whether gratitude is a duty (Berger, 1975), a virtue (Wellman, 1999) or both (McConnell, 
1993). Here, we examined whether the layperson’s judgments of gratitude are associated with 
judgments of being virtuous. For instance, when presented with descriptions of fictional 
characters, participants were also asked “How VIRTUOUS is this person?” This allowed us 
to explore whether ratings of gratitude and virtue correlate in a significant way. Was a more 
grateful person also deemed a more virtuous person? 
  
Method 
Participants 
 50 students from the University of Birmingham (35 female, ages 18–24, mean age 19 
years, 4 months) participated in Study 3 in exchange for course credits. All participants were 
U.K. citizens. Students who participated in Studies 1 and 2 were excluded from this study. 
Design and procedure  
 Participants were presented with 16 fictitious characters. Each character was 
described using three different gratitude features. The features were either central, peripheral, 
marginal, or remote, based on their sum of rank3 (see Table 1). Features with an associated 
sum of rank of 1–20 were deemed central gratitude features; those ranked 21–40 were 
considered peripheral features; 41–61 were deemed marginal features; and any features 
named once or twice in Study 1 but removed from further analysis were considered remote 
features. Three gratitude features formed one character description (see Figure 1). Crucially, 
the valence ratings of the character descriptions were matched across conditions to avoid any 
confounds across the four conditions. The difference in valence ratings across conditions was 
not significant (F (3, 44) = .456, p = .71).  
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There were 16 trials in total (one trial being equal to one character description); 4 
from the central condition, 4 from the peripheral condition, 4 marginal, and 4 remote. After 
reading each description, participants answered 7 questions which gauged their impressions 
of the fictitious characters (see Figure 1). The key question was “How GRATEFUL is this 
person?” Following Gregg et al. (2008), questions 2–6 incorporated descriptors from the Big 
Five personality traits (Costa & McCrae, 1992). These 5 questions constitute filler items; 
however they were chosen because of the proposed link between virtue, or character 
strengths, and personality (Cawley, Martin, & Johnson, 2000; Park, Peterson, & Seligman, 
2004). Question 7 was included to shed light on the link between gratitude and virtue. All 
questions were answered using a Likert scale, from 1 = not at all to 7 = extremely. 
Every participant took part in all 16 trials and the order of the trials was 
counterbalanced across participants. The order in which the 7 questions appeared was also 
counterbalanced across trials.  
 
[Figure 1.] 
  
 
Results 
We began by examining responses to the key question “How GRATEFUL is this 
person?” An ANOVA of the difference between responses to the four conditions revealed a 
significant difference (F (3, 147) = 37.282, p < .001). Follow up comparisons revealed that 
the central condition yielded significantly greater ratings of gratitude than the peripheral 
condition (t (49) = 2.672, p <.05); the peripheral condition generated significantly higher 
gratitude ratings than the marginal condition (t (49) = 4.642, p < .001); and the marginal 
condition bore out significantly greater gratitude ratings than the remote condition (t (49) = 
2.155, p < .05) (see Figure 2).  
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[Figure 2.] 
 
 
Another objective of this study was to examine the relationship between gratitude 
ratings and virtue ratings. Was there a correlation between responses to “How GRATEFUL is 
this person” and “How VIRTUOUS is this person”? A bivariate correlation revealed a large, 
positive and significant correlation between gratitude and virtue ratings (r = .61, p < .001). 
 Interestingly, the data also revealed a significant, large, positive correlation between 
gratitude and agreeableness (r = .62, p < .001); and gratitude and conscientiousness (r = .63, p 
< .001); a medium positive correlation between gratitude and openness (r = .49, p < .001); 
and a small positive correlation between gratitude and extroversion (r = .20, p < .01). There 
was also a small negative correlation between gratitude and neuroticism (r = -.25, p < .001).  
Given the strong and significant positive correlation between ratings of gratitude and 
virtue, we examined whether participants’ responses to “How VIRTUOUS is this person?” 
followed the same linear pattern as described above for gratitude ratings. To do this, we 
examined the differences in virtue ratings across the four gratitude conditions. The ANOVA 
revealed a significant difference between the four conditions (F (3, 147) = 15.931, p < .001). 
Comparisons across the conditions revealed that the central condition yielded significantly 
greater virtue ratings than the peripheral condition (t (49) = 4.374, p <. 001); and the 
peripheral condition yielded significantly greater virtue ratings than the marginal condition (t 
(49) = 2.561, p < .05). There was no significant difference between marginal and remote 
conditions (t (49) = -.765, p = .45).  
As noted above, there were similarly strong and significant correlations between 
ratings of gratitude and agreeableness as well as gratitude and conscientiousness. An 
ANOVA revealed that the difference in agreeableness and conscientiousness ratings across 
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the four gratitude conditions were also significant (Agreeableness: F (3,147) = 20.067, p < 
.001; Conscientiousness: F (3,147) = 21.046; p < .001). Comparisons across the individual 
conditions revealed that the central condition generated significantly greater agreeable and 
conscientious ratings than the peripheral condition (Agreeable: t (49) = 5.221, p < .001; 
Conscientious: t (49) = 3.450, p < .001); the peripheral condition generated significantly 
greater agreeable and conscientious ratings than the marginal condition (Agreeable: t (49) =  
3.074, p < .01; Conscientious: t (49) = 4.600, p < .001); and the  marginal condition yielded 
significantly lower conscientious ratings than the remote condition (t (49) = -2.078, p < .05). 
There was no significant difference between the marginal and remote conditions for 
agreeable ratings (t (49) = -1.015, p =.315). 
 
Discussion 
 Study 3 showed that the combined centrality and frequency of features affects 
people’s cognitions about gratitude. Fictitious characters depicting more central (and 
frequent) features of gratitude are deemed to be more grateful than those exhibiting less 
central features. This final study demonstrates, like Lambert et al. (2009), that gratitude has a 
prototypical structure according to Rosch’s (1975) specification. Features of gratitude can be 
freely generated; these features can be rated in terms of their centrality to the concept; and the 
more central features have been shown to affect the layperson’s cognition about gratitude 
more than the less central features. We have also revealed a linear relationship between the 
conditions of this study (central through to remote) and the key descriptor (gratitude).  
Crucially here, we have evidenced a large, positive, and significant correlation 
between ratings of gratitude and ratings of virtuousness. In the Introduction, we asked 
whether gratitude and virtue are intrinsically linked and whether gratitude is deemed a virtue. 
This study offers initial empirical evidence for a link between gratitude and perceived virtue. 
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This correlation alongside the linear relationship between ratings of virtue and conditions 
suggests that perceptions of a grateful person coincide with perceptions of being virtuous. 
However, this result leaves us in the dark as to why this relationship appears. It might be that 
virtue and gratitude are perceived as distinct constructs that are correlated, or equally, the 
concept of virtue may be perceived as one that is made up of individual virtue-traits, which 
includes gratitude. Further prototype analyses may elucidate this question. The current 
authors are presently conducting a prototype analysis examining the concept of virtue itself. 
Akin to this study, we have asked participants to list all the actions, emotions, thoughts, and 
feelings that are involved in virtue. We hope this will allow us to examine whether the 
concept of virtue is believed to be made up of individual virtues, and whether gratitude enters 
the list.  
Other interesting correlations arise from examining gratitude alongside the Big Five 
personality traits. Gratitude ratings correlate with all five of the filler descriptors. The 
strongest of these correlations are with agreeableness and conscientiousness. This is not the 
first study to demonstrate a link between gratitude and agreeableness; Cawley et al. (2000) 
also highlight a relationship between these two concepts. It is not hard to find a rational 
explanation of why these two items might be related; exhibiting grateful features such as 
appreciation and expressing thanks not only makes you grateful but could also make you 
likable. This correlation is all the more fitting given the perceived link between gratitude and 
virtue; if virtue is commonly thought of as being morally good, then being agreeable fits 
nicely into this equation. Cawley et al. (2000, p.28) go as far as saying that the trait of 
agreeableness (although originally specified in an allegedly non-moral way) can be thought 
of as a virtue. Indeed, our data did also demonstrate a large, positive, and significant 
correlation between virtuousness and agreeableness (r = .55, p < .001).  
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 McCullough, Emmons, and Tsang (2002) examined correlations between their 
gratitude scale (the GQ6) and a measure of the Big Five personality traits. Their analyses 
demonstrated a positive correlation between gratitude and extroversion, conscientiousness, 
and openness; and a negative association between gratitude and neuroticism. These 
correlations are mirrored in our work.   
The similarities between these two sets of correlations would suggest that the design 
we employed here has been successful in examining perceived features of  gratitude; not only 
do we establish different degrees of gratitude across conditions, but we also demonstrate that 
these evaluations of gratitude correlate well with measures of personality. Notably, these 
correlations are evident within an objective experimental paradigm. Whereas previous 
measures of gratitude depend upon self-reporting (such as McCullough et al.’s GQ6), this 
design allows for a more objective assessment of gratitude which , arguably, avoids biases of 
self-deception and social desirability.   
 
General Discussion 
 In the Introduction, we highlighted two major problems that plague the current 
gratitude literature: (1) an over-reliance on previous definitions from dictionaries or by 
authorities in the field, and (2) a tendency to superimpose philosophical assumptions about 
gratitude on the concept. The aim of this paper was to take a step back from this standpoint to 
examine the layperson’s view of gratitude. We believe that studying the layperson’s 
perception of gratitude is of fundamental importance, especially when considering that the 
vast majority of gratitude studies rely on self-report measures. This prototype analysis helps 
build a picture of what the layperson perceives gratitude to be and what features it is 
comprised of.  
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There are good reasons to value this technique. A commonly cited definition of 
gratitude comes, for instance, from Emmons and Shelton (2002), who describe gratitude as 
encompassing a “felt sense of wonder.” Crucially, we found that not one participant referred 
to “wonder” in this prototype analysis. Similarly, this feature did not appear in Lambert et 
al.’s U.S. sample. Emmons and Shelton’s description, it seems, is a clear case where 
definitions of gratitude do not map onto the layperson’s conceptions. Perhaps this should 
sound a warning signal for social scientists who, presumably, want their research to be social 
scientific all the way down to the conceptual ground.  
 A key finding in this prototype analysis has been the higher frequency of negative 
gratitude features in the U.K. sample relative to those documented in the U.S. study by 
Lambert et al. (2009). In the U.K., gratitude is linked with various negative emotions 
including guilt, indebtedness, embarrassment, and awkwardness. We intimated that this 
difference may be due to different conceptualizations, or equally it may lie with a greater 
admittance (or recognition) of negative aspects of gratitude in the U.K. population. Whilst 
gratitude has been identified as a universal character strength (Park et al., 2006), the construct 
itself is unlikely to be conceptualized in a universal way; each culture encompasses specific 
social norms which will in turn affect how a construct is cognized (see Appadurai, 1985; 
Cohen, 2006; Naito, Wangwan, & Tani, 2005).  
 This finding speaks to one of the problematic conceptual issues we highlighted in the 
Introduction, namely that gratitude is typically portrayed in the literature as an inherently 
positive concept. Watkins et al. (2006) go as far as to separate gratitude entirely from the 
negative state of indebtedness, suggesting that the two are “distinct emotional states” (p. 
236). Whilst their studies demonstrate that gratitude can be dissociated from indebtedness, 
they do not discuss the issue of whether gratitude typically is dissociated from indebtedness 
(by the layperson). Indeed, you might experience gratitude with no feelings of indebtedness, 
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and equally indebtedness without feelings of gratefulness, but this does not suggest that the 
two do not typically coincide or feed into one another. Interestingly, when attempting to 
dissociate the concepts of gratitude and indebtedness, the authors demonstrate how the two 
are significantly correlated (r = .25, p < .01). Our own data suggests that these two concepts 
may well coincide; participants frequently named indebtedness as a feature/characteristic that 
they believe is typical to instances of gratitude. Participants in this study appear to associate 
rather than dissociate gratitude and indebtedness. Similarly, there are reasonably high 
frequencies for guilt and embarrassment/awkwardness. These responses seem to suggest that 
laypeople (at least in this U.K. sample) do acknowledge the more negative side of gratitude 
experience. Given these findings, perhaps future research should focus on when gratitude and 
negative constructs, such as guilt or indebtedness, tend to coincide, rather than holding on so 
strongly to the view that gratitude is inherently positive.  
 Another discrepancy across the two cultures studied here appears to be directly related 
to social convention. U.K. responses contained significantly more references to politeness 
including terms such as “polite,” “handshake,” “good manners,” and “custom.” We proposed 
that gratitude in the U.K. may include associations with customary pledges of thanks. This 
focus on habitual processes of gratitude is much less prevalent in the U.S. sample4.  
 The cross-cultural differences that have been highlighted by our U.K. – U.S. sample 
comparison have implications for the future examination of gratitude. Our results suggest that 
gratitude may contain a common core with culturally ubiquitous features, in addition to 
socially constructed elements that change depending on the culture being studied. It is 
important that researchers are aware of how their investigations might be affected by 
different conceptualizations of gratitude. For instance, gratitude interventions that are based 
on a conflicting conception of what gratitude is (and when it is/should be experienced) could 
have damaging effects in the culture(s) in question. Similarly, a measure of gratitude can only 
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be valid if both the administrator and the participant are in agreement as to what gratitude is.  
This is, indeed, one of our current concerns when considering the available gratitude 
measures. There are three commonly used measures of gratitude; the GQ6, (McCullough et 
al., 2002), the GRAT (Watkins, Woodward, Stone, & Kolts, 2003), and the Appreciation 
Scale (Adler & Fagley, 2005). However, none of these scales encompasses a measure of the 
individuals’ understandings of the concept itself; instead they are largely focused on the 
emotion/feeling component of gratitude. One possible advancement of gratitude measures, 
and one that the current authors hope to be able to offer in time, would be one that also 
examines the concept itself. This would ensure that the researchers are aware of differences 
in conceptualizations and could allow for a measure that could be used more readily across 
different cultures. 
We believe the cross-cultural differences that we have begun to highlight here deserve 
further scrutiny by extending the current paradigm to examine other cultures. This would 
allow us to further examine which features of gratitude are universal (i.e. form the common 
core of gratitude) and which constitute socially constructed elements specific to individual 
cultures. However, prototype analysis will only offer initial evidence of cross-cultural 
differences in how gratitude is conceptualized. This method, after all, does not distinguish 
between features identified as part of a given concept and features simply identified as being 
typically associated with a concept. A more in-depth examination of how gratitude is 
conceptualized would, therefore, be needed to draw any strong conclusions about cross-
cultural differences.  
Study 2 demonstrated noteworthy differences between frequency and centrality 
ratings of gratitude features. A feature identified numerous times by respondents in Study 1 
did not necessarily translate to high centrality ratings in Study 2. We have noted here the 
importance of both types of judgment. The frequency of gratitude features can be thought of 
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as a measure of respondents’ quick, intuitive thoughts about gratitude. In current prototype 
studies, these are accorded less importance than centrality ratings which invoke careful 
decisions about what elements should or should not constitute gratitude. We believe that 
assessments of what should constitute gratitude may be very different from assessments of 
what does constitute gratitude, and in this way centrality ratings may evoke more accepted 
and socially desirable notions about the phenomenon of interest than frequency ratings. 
Whilst we do not disregard the importance of centrality ratings, we believe that frequency 
ratings deserve more merit. Therefore, our final study utilized a combination of both these 
factors.  
The results from Study 3 demonstrated that combining frequency and centrality was a 
successful endeavor; different degrees of gratitude were identified in relation to the four 
levels of centrality and frequency of features. This could therefore offer a new way of 
examining prototypical features, in which frequency is accorded the same status as centrality, 
and whereby both instant, intuitive and carefully thought out features of gratitude are 
included in tests of cognition.  Integrating the two types of rating would be consistent with 
the post-1980s affective revolution in cognitive science and its view that the human mind 
comprises both an ancient and largely automatic affective system alongside a newer and less 
spontaneous reasoning system. 
Akin to Lambert et al.’s (2009) prototype study of gratitude, we successfully 
demonstrated how different features of gratitude can affect cognition. Exploring the 
formation of impressions on fictitious characters has allowed for objective measurements of 
grateful traits and has also permitted some novel and interesting correlations to emerge, the 
most salient of these being a correlation between gratitude and virtue. In demonstrating a 
positive and significant correlation between ratings of gratitude and ratings of virtuousness, 
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the paper also begins to answer the question of whether gratitude is considered a virtue, even 
if determining whether it is the “parent of all other virtues” is (as yet) some way off. 
To conclude, the current study aims to advance prototype studies generally, and 
gratitude studies in particular. With respect to prototype analyses, it extends a new measure 
that accords equal weight to frequency and centrality ratings, to reflect instant and intuitive 
judgments in addition to carefully deliberated ones. In addition to this methodological 
contribution, the key findings of the paper advance the study of gratitude by demonstrating 
some potentially noteworthy cross-cultural differences in U.S. and U.K. descriptions of 
gratitude alongside a shared nucleus of common features. We believe the differences we have 
identified now warrant further empirical examination in the Anglophone world.  
We are strongly committed to the view that the definition of gratitude should not be 
left to “experts” (be they psychologists or philosophers).  A thorough examination of how 
gratitude is conceptualized by laypeople is required to complement these existing views. We 
hope that this paper demonstrates how such an exploration is a valuable endeavor and one 
that deserves further inquiry. Only when we fully understand how gratitude is understood by 
the general public will we be able to measure it accurately, teach it successfully, and foster it 
effectively.  
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Authors’ Notes 
1. It should be noted that Roberts has recently adapted his view on the concept of gratitude to 
involve more flexibility than his original standard analysis allowed; compare his 2004 paper 
and his 2014 paper (in press). 
2. Note that a * indicates where two categories have been collapsed in one sample, yet counted 
separately in the other. Here, for the un-collapsed sample, we present the total % of mentions 
and average positivity and centrality ratings as well as the separate ratings in parentheses. 
3. Note that whilst we have combined ratings of centrality and frequency scores in this study, the 
same items across conditions could have been chosen based on centrality alone. In 
explanation, the mean centrality rating for the Central condition is 6.27; Peripheral 5.29; and 
Marginal 4.22. Therefore, readers who prefer the standard examination of centrality effects 
on cognition should be reassured that this study still depicts an examination of the effects of 
centrality ratings on cognition. 
4. One possible limitation should be acknowledged here. Whilst the categorizations were 
conducted by two examiners within each sample, they were performed by different 
experimenters across the two samples. This therefore raises the possibility that the previous 
experimenters may have grouped the features in a different way from the current coders. This 
leaves open the possibility that differences we see here could have been enhanced or, equally, 
diminished across the two samples. 
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